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NOTE
THE PRESENT STATUS OF AUTOMOBILE
GUEST STATUTES
Automobile "guest statutes,"' which deny recovery to a nonpaying automobile passenger injured as a result of his host driver's
ordinary negligence, have existed at one time or another in
twenty-eight states. 2 All of these statutes were enacted between
1927 and 19391 and were based on the reasoning of prior judicial
While the principal focus of this Note is upon legislative enactments, it must be noted
that in three states-Massachusetts, Georgia, and Wisconsin-limitations on a guest's cause
of action were exclusively ofjudicial creation and were never embodied in statutes. See Epps
v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297 (1921); Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118
N.E. 168 (1917); O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 185 N.W. 525 (1921); notes 13-18 and
accompanying text infra.
2 The following statutes are listed in both present form (where codified) and initial
session law form. Except for the Connecticut statute (which was never codified), the
California statute (which was nullified), and the Florida and Vermont statutes (which were
repealed), the original enactments appear in parentheses: ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 95 (1959) (No.
442, [1935] Ala. Acts 918); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-913 (1947) (No. 61, [1935] Ark. Acts 138);
ch. 787, § 1, [1929] Cal. Stat. 1580 (codified at CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1971))
(declared unconstitutional 1973); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963) (ch. 118, § 1, [1931]
Colo. Laws 460); ch. 308, 88 1-2, [1927] Conn. Acts 4404 (repealed 1937); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 21, § 6101 (1953) (ch. 270, §§ 1-2, [1929] 36 Del. Laws 795 (declared unconstitutional
1932); amended by ch. 26, §§ 1-2, [1933] 38 Del. Laws 159); ch. 18033, §§ 1-2, [1937] Fla.
Laws 671 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.59 (1968)) (repealed 1972); IDAHO C.ODE
§§ 49-1401 to -1402 (1967) (ch. 135, §§ 1-2, [1931] Idaho Laws 232); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95
1/2, § 10-201 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (§ 42-1, [1935] Ill. Laws 1221); IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-3-3-1 (Burns 1973) (ch. 201, §§ 1-2, [1929] Ind. Acts 679); IOwA CODE ANN. § 321.494
(Supp. 1972) (ch. 119, § 1, [1927] Iowa Acts 112); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-122b (1964) (ch. 81,
§ 1, [1931] Kan. Laws 146); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (1968) (No. 19, § 1, [1929 Mich.
Acts 43); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 32-1113 to -1116 (1947) (ch. 195, §§ 1-4, [1931] Mont.
Laws 550); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-740 (1968) (ch. 105, § 1, [1931] Neb. Laws 278); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41.180 (1971) (ch. 34, § 1, [1933] Nev. Stat. 29); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-24-1 to -2
(1972) (ch. 15, §§ 1-2, [1935] N.M. Laws 26); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-15-01 to -03 (1972) (ch.
184, §§ 1-3, [1931] N.D. Laws 310); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1965) (File No.
25, [1933] Ohio Laws 57); ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.115 (1971) (ch. 342, § 1, [1927] Ore. Laws
448 (declared unconstitutional 1928); amended by ch. 401, §§ 1-2, [1929] Ore. Laws 550);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962) (No. 659, §§ 1-2, [1930] S.C. Acts 1164); S.D. CONIPILED
LAws ANN. § 32-34-1 (1969) (ch. 147, § 1, [1933] S.D. Laws 154); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art.
6701b (1969), as amended ch. 28, § 3, [1973] Tex. Laws 42 (ch. 225, §§ 1-2, [1931] Tex. Laws
379); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-9-1 (1970) (ch. 52, §§ 1-2, [1935] Utah Laws 129); No. 78, § 1,
[1929] Vt. Laws 87 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1491 (1967)) (repealed 1970); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (1957) (ch. 285, § 1, [1938] Va. Acts 417); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.08.080
(1970) (ch. 18, §§ 1-2, [1933] Wash. Laws 145); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-233 (1967) (ch. 2, § 1,
[1931] Wyo. Laws 3).
3 Tipton, Florida'sAutomobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 287, 288 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Tipton].
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decisions. 4 Since their first appearance, guest statutes have been
subject to some praise 5 but a great deal more criticism. 6 Nevertheless, for over thiry years, where they have been enacted, guest
statutes have remained in operation with almost no significant
7
changes.
In 1969, however, the Vermont legislature repealed that state's
guest statute. 8 The Florida legislature followed suit in 1972. 9 And
in 1973, the Supreme Court of California declared that state's
guest statute unconstitutional.' ° These and other recent developments suggest that state legislatures and courts have begun to
reexamine guest statutes more critically than ever before. This new
assessment raises the fundamental issue of whether the guest
statutes are compatible with modern legal and social standards, and
if not, how they are to be treated.
I
BACKGROUND

OF THE GUEST STATUTES

A. Judicial Origin
Automobile guest statutes have their origins in judicial
decisions." In the early part of this century, the rapid development
of the automobile brought a corresponding expansion of litigation
dealing with automobile accidents. Inevitably, claims by injured
guest passengers against their host drivers arose, and courts were
4 See, e.g., Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297 (1921); Massaletti v. Fitzroy,
228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917); Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931); Saxe v.
Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 P. 27 (1926).
' See, e.g., Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 P. 841 (1930); Weber, Guest
Statutes, 11 U. CIN. L. REv. 24 (1937); 18 CALIF. L. REv. 184 (1930).
6 See, e.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363, 94 N.W.2d 858 (1959); W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 187,382-85 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Lascher, HardLaws Make
Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The CaliforniaGuest Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAw. 1 (1968); White, The
Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger, 20 VA. L. REv. 326 (1934); 14 IowA
L. Rnv. 243 (1929); Note, Liability Under Automobile Guest Statutes, 1 Wyo. L.J. 182 (1947).
In general, the only changes in most statutes have been relatively minor additions,
deletions, or rewordings. In Delaware, for example, the guest statute was amended in 1949
to cover boats, airplanes, and other vehicles, Ch. 49, § 1, [1949] 47 Del. Laws 91.
8 No. 194, § 1, [1969] Vt. Laws Adj. Sess. 70 (effective 1970); see notes 120-32 and
accompanying text infra.
9 Ch. 72-1, [1972] Fla. Laws 113; see notes 133-45 and accompanying text infra.
10 In Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973), the court
found that the guest statute (CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1971)) violated the equal
protection guarantees of the California and United States Constitutions. See notes 156-82
and accompanying text infra.
u See note 4 supra.

GUEST STATUTES

faced with the problem of determining the nature and extent of
the host's liability to his injured passenger. 12
An early case on the subject was Massaletti v. Fitzroy,' 3 in which
the plaintiff was injured as a result of the negligent driving of the
defendant's chauffeur. There was no question as to the plaintiff's
status as a nonpaying guest. Nor was there any doubt that the
defendant's servant had been negligent and that such negligence
was properly imputed to the defendant. However, the plaintiff
failed to allege or prove the existence of "gross negligence"' 4 on
the part of the defendant. The question for the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts was whether, in the absence of gross
negligence, the defendant-employer could be held liable to the
plaintiff-guest for the ordinary negligence of the chauffeur.
Following the reasoning of pre-automobile cases, 1 5 the court
determined that the defendant's duty of care to the plaintiff was no
greater than that of-a gratuitous bailee.' 6 The court adhered to the
rule that, in the case of a gratuitous undertaking, the defendant
would be held liable only if found guilty of gross negligence.' 7 In
concluding, the court acknowledged the difficulties involved in
distinguishing between the degrees of negligence, but emphasized
that such distinctions were necessary in order to achieve a just
result.18
12 This issue arises only in the context of private, as opposed to commercial, claims.

Public carriers have always been held to a high standard of care for the safety of passengers.
See, e.g., PROSSER 180.

13228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
14Id. at 489, 118 N.E. at 168.
15The leading pre-automobile case was West v. Poor, 196 Mass. 183, 81 N.E. 960
(1907), in which a child riding in a milk wagon without the driver's permission, but with his
knowledge, was injured while climbing down from the wagon. The court held that the driver
was not liable because he owed the child no greater duty of care than "that of a licensor or
gratuitous bailee." Id. at 185, 81 N.E. at 960 (emphasis added).
16 "The measure of liability of one who undertakes to carry gratis is the same as that of
one who undertakes to keep gratis." 228 Mass. at 508, 118 N.E. at 176-77. To a large degree,
the court's analogy to gratuitous bailments can be traced to Chief Justice Holt's opinion in
Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703), which also distinguished between gross and ordinary negligence. For a discussion of the degrees of negligence, see PROSSER 180-86.
17 228 Mass. at 506, 118 N.E. at 176.
18 The court stated this as follows:
Justice requires that the one who undertakes to perform a duty gratuitously should
not be under the same measure of obligation as one who enters upon the same
undertaking for pay. There is an inherent difficulty in stating the difference
between the measure of duty which is assumed in the two cases. But justice requires
that to make out liability in the case of a gratuitous undertaking the plaintiff ought
to prove a materially greater degree of negligenc& than he has to prove where the
defendant is to be paid for doing the same thing.
Id. at 510, 118 N.E. at 177. See generally note 77 infra.
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The Massaletti rule was subsequently adopted by courts in
Georgia, Washington, and Virginia. 19 Many other courts, however,
rejected the Massaletti rule. Even before the Massachusetts court's
decision, the Alabama Supreme Court had declared that it would
exact a standard of "reasonable care" from automobile hosts.2 0
Maine adopted a similar position, insisting that "the gratuitous
undertaker shall be mindful of the life and limb of his guest and
shall not unreasonably expose her to additional peril."'" Several
other courts adopted this line of reasoning, 22 some pointing to the
Massaletti rule's potential for anomalous results.2 3 As a result, until
19 Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297 (1921); Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30,
160 S.E. 77 (1931); Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 P. 27 (1926). InBoggs, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia embellished the Massachusetts court's view with its own notion
of hospitality by declaring that "[t]o hold that a guest who, for his own pleasure, is driving
with his host may recover from him for injuries suffered where there is no culpable
negligence, shocks one's sense of justice." 157 Va. at 39, 160 S.E. at 81.
Some courts, while approving of Massaletti's notions of justice, preferred the analogy of
the licensee on real property. Wisconsin adopted this rationale in O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis.
456, 185 N.W. 525 (1921). However, as Dean Prosser stated:
The soundness of the analogy to passive conditions on land may be doubted,
since one who is driving a car with bad brakes is certainly engaged in a dangerous
active operation, even though he does not know that they are bad.
PROSSER 383. Wisconsin eventually did away with the rule in McConville v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
20 The express or implied duty of the car owner and driver to the occupant of the
car is to exercise reasonable care in its operation not to unreasonably expose to
danger and injury the occupant by increasing the hazard of that method of travel.
He must exercise the care and diligence which a man of reasonable prudence,
engaged in like business, would exercise for his own protection and the protection
of his family and property-a care which must be reasonably commensurate with
the nature [of] and hazards attending this particular mode of travel.
Perkins v. Galloway, 194 Ala. 265, 272, 69 So. 875, 877 (1915), aff'd, 198 Ala. 658, 73 So.
956 (1916).
21 Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120, 128, 103 A. 4, 7 (1918).
22 Munson v. Rupker, 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N.E. 169 (1925) (and cases collected
therein); Marple v. Haddad, 103 W. Va. 508, 118 S.E. 113 (1927). It is interesting to note
that in states following the Massaletti rule prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
federal courts sitting in diversity cases sometimes used the doctrine of "federal common law"
to circumvent application of state court decisions denying recovery to guests. See, e.g.,
Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1934) (avoiding application of Virginia law).
21 In Munson v. Rupker, 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N.E. 169 (1925), the court said that
[i]t will not do to say that the operator of an automobile owes no more duty to a
person riding with him as a guest at sufferance, or as a self-invited guest, than a
gratuitous bailee owes to a block of wood.
Id. at 30, 148 N.E. at 174. The Alabama Supreme Court highlighted this point with the
f~llowing hypothetical situation:
[I]f plaintiff is only entitled to protection against wanton injury, then it may happen
that if a person requests gratuitous transportation for himself and also for a basket
of apples, the gratuitous private carrier may be liable for the injury to the property,
but not for injury to him, although he committed his person to the keeping of the
carrier as fully as he did the property.
Wurtzburger v. Oglesby, 222 Ala. 151, 155, 131 So. 9, 12 (1930).
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about 1930, it remained a minority rule,2 4 and the prevailing
standard in most jurisdictions was the common law rule that a
guest could recover for injuries caused by his host's ordinary
negligence.26
B.

The Rise of the Statutes

In 1927, Iowa and Connecticut enacted the nation's first statutes denying recovery to injured guest passengers whose host
drivers were guilty of no more than ordinary negligence.26 The
Iowa guest statute provided simply that an automobile guest could
not recover for his injuries unless his host was driving while
intoxicated or was guilty of "reckless operation" of the motor
vehicle.27 The Connecticut statute was more elaborate, denying
recovery to a gratuitous guest in all cases except where the
operator's conduct was "intentional" or evinced "heedlessness" or
"reckless disregard of the rights of others. 28 Unlike the Iowa
statute, the Connecticut law specifically stated that it did not apply
to cases in which the passenger was riding with a carrier or with a
seller demonstrating a car for sale. 9 In both states, however, it was
obvious that, for most cases, the respective legislatures wanted to
24 Only Massachusetts, Georgia, Wisconsin, Washington, and Virginia ever adopted a

judicial standard of gross negligence. See notes 1 & 4 supra.
22 See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 950-51 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as HARPER & JAMES].

26 The Iowa statute provided that
. the owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for any damages
to any passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation
and not for hire, unless damage is caused as a result of the driver of said motor
vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or because of the reckless
operation by him of such motor vehicle.
Ch. 119, § 1, [1927] Iowa Acts 112.
The Connecticut law read:
Section 1. No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for
damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of
accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner
or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of
others.
Sec. 2. This act shall not relieve a public carrier or any owner or operator of a
motor vehicle while the same is being demonstrated to a prospective purchaser of
responsibility for any injuries sustained by a passenger being transported by such
public carrier or by such owner or operator.
Ch. 308, §§ 1-2, [1927] Conn. Acts 4404.
Oregon also passed a guest statute in 1927. However, because it released a host from
liability for any degree of negligence on his part, it was declared unconstitutional the
following year. See notes 52-55 and accompanying text infra.
27 Ch. 119, § 1, [1927] Iowa Acts 112.
28 Ch. 308, § 1, [1927] Conn. Acts 4404.
29 Id. § 2.
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prevent a driver from being held liable to his guest for ordinary
negligence.
Although legislative history regarding guest statutes is almost
nonexistent in Iowa and Connecticut and in other states which
followed their lead, 30 several basic reasons for passage of guest
statutes have been offered by courts and commentators. 3 1 The
justification most frequently espoused in one form or another has
been the notion of protecting the hospitable driver from suits by an
ungrateful guest. 32 The economic conditions of the 1930's gave
particular force to the hospitality rationale for the guest statutes.
The Depression is credited with causing a substantial increase in
the number of hitchhikers on America's highways. 3 3 It was feared
that these strangers would take advantage of generous but unsuspecting motorists, and thus offend society's sense of justice and
hospitality. 34 Although the fear of "hitchhiker suits" had almost no
statistical basis, 3 5 it nevertheless became a popular and frequently36
cited justification for the statutes.
The most important reason for the passage of guest statutes,
however, was effective lobbying on the part of insurance
companies. 37 Although it has been suggested that other lobbies
3' For example, the Connecticut House and Senate Journals for 1927 give only the bare
essentials of the statute's history (as House Bill 376), i.e., its sponsors, committees reporting
on it, and its passage.
See generally Tipton 287-303. See also 2 HARPER & JAMES 961; PROSSER 187.
32 In Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 P. 841 (1930), the court characterized
the state's guest statute as a legislative frown upon the guest who, like the dog in the
proverb, "bites the hand that feeds him." Id. at 87, 293 P. at 843. This innate feeling that a
guest should not be allowed to- recover from a host guilty of no more than ordinary
negligence is a tacit assumption embodied in all guest statutes. See Naudzius v. Lahr, 253
Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); 18 CALIF. L. REV. 184 (1930).
" See, e.g., Tipton 287.
" As one observer put it:
[S]uch suits should be discouraged, inasmuch as they are unsportsmanlike and an
abuse of hospitality; they saddle the owner or driver of the car with an unreasonable burden and thereby discourage invitations to guests, thus preventing those who
cannot afford to own automobiles from obtaining the health and pleasure derived
from their use.
18 CALIF. L. REv. 184 (1930).
15 Dean Prosser commented dryly on the "hitchhiker rationale": "In legislative hearings
there is frequent mention of the hitch-hiker, who gets little sympathy. The writer once
found a hitch-hiker case, but has mislaid it. He has been unable to find another." PROSSER
187 n.8.
36 See, e.g., Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 185 P.2d 784 (1947) (referring to "bums"
and "hitchhikers").
Interestingly, of the guest statutes currently in operation, only the Illinois statute is
directed exclusively against hitchhikers. This was accomplished by a recent amendment. See
notes 146-49 and accompanying text infra.
"7 PROSSER 187; Tipton 288. Unfortunately, because of the generally "quiet" nature of
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aided the campaign,3 8 it is logical that the insurance companies
would be the driving force behind the legislation. With the rise of
the automobile and automobile liability insurance, the incentives
for drivers and passengers to engage in collusive actions to defraud
insurers increased correspondingly 9 The implicit assumption of
the insurance companies' argument was that the best way to prevent collusive lawsuits was to prevent suit by anyone who might
bring such an action.40 By 1939, whether through desire to protect
generous drivers, dislike of hitchhikers, pressure from insurance
41
companies, or a combination of these factors, twenty-six states
had adopted guest statutes similar to those of Iowa and Connecticut.
C. Constitutionality
Having been a leader in the adoption of guest statutes, Connecticut became the first state to adjudicate some of the major
constitutional issues arising under this type of legislation. In Silver
v. Silver,4 2 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors upheld the
statute against a plaintiff's contention that it "denie[d] to guests in
motor vehicles the equal protection of the laws." 43 The court rested
its judgment on the conclusion that the matters regulated by the
statute were well within the police power of the state. Accordingly,
there was no inherent unreasonableness in the fact that the automobile was used as the basis for determining the operator's duty
to a guest.4 4
In the dissenting opinion, however, Chief Justice Wheeler
lobbying practices, very little is known about the lobbyists' role in influencing guest legislation other than the fact that it was highly successful. It is perhaps more than mere
coincidence that one of the first guest statutes was enacted in the nation's "insurance capital,"
Connecticut.
38 In some states, farm groups also may have pressed for adoption of the statutes. See
Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REv. 90, 91

(1961).
39 Weber,supra note 5, at 35.
40 For a response to this argument, see notes 169-72 and accompanying text infra. As
one commentator suggested while discussing the Connecticut statute, "[t]he prevention of
collusive suits hardly seems to justify the legislature's departure from the established
common law rule." 38 YALE L.J. 267, 268 (1928).
41 See note 2 supra.
42 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240 (1928).
43 Id. at 376, 143 A. at 242.
44 The court stated its position as follows:
The duty which the owner or operator owes to his guest in the operation of the
automobile being a legitimate subject-matter of legislation, the guest is not deprived
of the equal protection of the law because that duty is made to vary from that owed
to a house guest or a guest in some other mode of conveyance.
Id. at 378, 143 A. at 242.
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considered the classifications "unreasonable" and "arbitrary. '4 5
They violated the equal protection clause, he said, because they
took away from the automobile guest "a right of action for ordinary negligence which the guest in every other mode of con46
veyance still enjoys under the law."
The plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
and in 1929 the Court upheld the validity of the statute and
refused to inquire into the "wisdom" of its enactment. 47 The Court
stressed the familiar doctrine that "the Constitution does not forbid
the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized
by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object,"48 in
this case the elimination of "vexatious litigation" arising from
automobile guest cases. 49 Because the statute "strikes at the evil
where it is felt and reaches the class of cases where it most
frequently occurs," i.e., automobile guest cases, the Court concluded
that the statute did not deprive automobile guest passengers of the
50
equal protection of the laws.
Once the Supreme Court had made this pronouncement, it is
probable that those state legislatures which had contemplated
adoption of guest statutes, but which had awaited an adjudication
of constitutionality, now felt secure enough to pass them. 5 1 Several
states, however, ran into state constitutional obstacles. Guest laws
were enacted in Oregon 52 and Delaware 53 which released the host
from liability to a guest for any degree of negligence on his part.
The respective state courts held these statutes unconstitutional as
violating state constitutional guarantees against legislative abolition
of rights of action for injury to persons and property. 54 But, in
both states, when the statutes were amended to allow recovery for
45 Id. at 386, 143 A. at 245.
46 Id. at 380, 143 A. at 243.
47 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929). This has become the leading case on the
constitutionality of guest statutes. See note 161 and accompanying text infra.
48 280 U.S. at 122.

49 Id. at 123.
50 Id. at 124. It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court, like the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, was not concerned with the distinction "between
passengers who pay and those who do not," but rather with the distinction "between
gratuitous passengers in automobiles and those in other classes of vehicles." Id. at 123. Later
cases raised the question of the validity of the distinction between paying and nonpaying
automobile guests. See notes 162-72 and accompanying text infra.
51 For dates of enactment, see note 2 supra.
52 Ch. 342, § 1, [1927] Ore. Laws 448.
53 Ch. 270, §§ 1-2, [1929] 36 Del. Laws 795.
54 Coleman v. Rhodes, 35 Del. 120,.159 A. 649 (1932); Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589,
271 P. 998 (1928), petitionfor rehearing denied, 127 Ore. 597, 272 P. 893 (1928).
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certain types of aggravated misconduct, the courts upheld their
55
validity.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, however, found that guest
statutes per se violated the Kentucky Constitution. 5 6 The court felt
that "the conclusion is inescapable that the intention of the framers
of the Constitution was to inhibit the Legislature from abolishing
the rights of action for damages for death or injuries caused by
negligence.15 7 Although other guest statute jurisdictions had similar constitutional provisions, 58 none seemed to find them a serious
obstacle to the validity of the statutes. 5 9 And for over forty years,
until the recent California decision in Brown v. Merlo,60 no other
61
guest statute was held unconstitutional.
II
CRITICISM OF GUEST STATUTES

Theoretical Problems
Almost simultaneously with the passage and implementation of
the guest statutes, substantial criticism of their theoretical foundation began to appear. The strongest lines of early criticism attacked
two basic elements of the statutes: (1) their abrogation of the
common law rule of reasonable care,62 and (2) their validity under
state and federal constitutions.6 3 Although both of these arguments
A.

55 Gallegher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 183 A. 620 (1936); Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Ore. 330,
40 P.2d 1009 (1935).
56 In Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932), the court found that the
guest statute (ch. 85, [1930] Ky. Acts 253), contravened §§ 14, 241, and principally § 54 of
the Kentucky Constitution. The latter reads: "The general assembly shall have no power to
limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or
property."
57 243 Ky. at 539, 49 S.W.2d at 350.
5' See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
59 In fact, the Kentucky court's interpretation of the state constitutional provisions (see
note 56 supra), has been criticized as being too literal. See Weber, supra note 5, at 30-32. It is
likely, however, that similar constitutional provisions were at least partially responsible for
the refusal of many states to adopt any form of limitation on a guest's right to recover
damages.
60 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); see notes 156-82 and
accompanying text infra.
61 A good example of a fairly recent adjudication of constitutionality is Westover v.
Schaffer, 205 Kan. 62, 368 P.2d 251 (1970), in which the Kansas guest law was found to
violate neither the federal nor the state constitution.
62 See note 40 supra.
63 As one early critic put it:
[T]his statute without reason discriminates in favor of guests who are not occupants
of automobiles, guests who ride as paying guests and guests of reckless or intoxicated drivers and against ordinary nonpaying guests in automobiles. Such a
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had been answered in some degree by the United States Supreme
Court, 64 the criticism did not abate. And these two issues remain
the principal points of departure for modern attacks on the
65
statutes.
The theoretical weaknesses of the guest statutes have proven
especially helpful in attacks by judicial critics. Trial and appellate
judges, although constrained by the pronouncements supporting
the statutes' constitutionality and modification of the common
law, 66 found a useful tool in the principle of strict construction of
statutes in derogation of the common law. 67 Courts using -this
device have been able to narrowly circumscribe the operation of
their jurisdictions' statutes so that they deny recovery to as few
people as possible. 68
The basic policy rationale for the statutes was also subject to
attack. While recognizing thiat perjury and collusion might be present in a suit by a guest against his host driver, many commentators
were disturbed by the fact that the statutes were based upon a
presumption that these evils were present. 69 Moreover, the wholesale
denial of litigation rights to so broad a class as all automobile guests
seemed especially unnecessary and harsh in the light of preexisting
methods of dealing with perjury and collusion.7 0 In short, even
though the statutes passed constitutional muster, and even though
they might have prevented some abuses of the judicial process,
classification is so arbitrary that the denial of equal protection of the law seems to
appear beyond a reasonable doubt.
14 IOWA L. REv. 243, 246 (1929); see Annot., 111 A.L.R. 1011 (1937). See also notes 52-57
and accompanying text supra.
" In New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), the Court, in referring to
statutory modification of common law rules, declared that "[n]o person has a vested interest
in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit." Id. at
198. In Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929), the Court had followed this reasoning. See note
48 and accompanying text supra.
65 See generally Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973);
Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363, 94 N.W.2d 858 (1959); Lascher, supra note 6.
66 See note 64 supra.
617See notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.
6 See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES 961.
69 One judge exclaimed indignantly, "[W]hat right has this court to assume that actions
by guest passengers are attended by collusion, fraud, and perjury. There is no justification
for any such assumption .... Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234, 234 N.W. 581, 587
(1931) (McDonald, J., dissenting).
70 "The charge of perjury and collusion between the driver and passenger is a matter
peculiarly for the criminal courts. It furnishes no sound reason for altering the substantive
rights and duties of the driver and passenger." White, supra note 6, at 333 (footnote
omitted).
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many observers remained convinced of the basic
7'
statutes.
the
behind
rationale
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policy
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Practical Problems
1. Construction

From the very beginning, problems began to arise in connection with the implementation of the guest statutes. One of the most
serious difficulties concerned whether the statutes should be construed strictly or liberally. 72 On this point courts differed radically.
A few took the view that the statutes must be liberally construed in
73
order to carry out their legislative intent. The vast majority,
however, followed the old maxim that, being in derogation of the
74
common law, the statutes were to be strictly construed. To complicate matters, some courts even managed to75 combine strict and
liberal rules of construction in certain cases.
Included in the matter of construction is the interpretation of
' 76 and what
the terms used in the statutes. Who is a "guest
7 7 are the questions which a court
constitutes "gross negligence"
7! It is interesting to note that, toward the end of the flurry of legislation enacting the

guest statutes, Connecticut apparently had second thoughts about its own trailblazing statute
and repealed it in 1937. See ch. 82, § 540e, [1937] Conn. Stat. 277 (Supp. 1939).
72 See generally Georgetta, The Major Issues in a Guest Case, 1954 INS. L.J. 583. See also 5
D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 109-11 (1966).
" The South Dakota Supreme Court stated the doctrine as follows:
While the common law is in force in this jurisdiction except where changed by
statute or by other expression of the sovereign will, . . . the rule of strict
construction of statutes in derogation of common law does not obtain in this state.
Our function is to effectuate the legislative purpose through liberal construction.
Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 58, 298 N.W. 266, 268 (1941). Similarly, Iowa adheres to
the view that "[a]lthough our guest statute is in derogation of the common law it is to be
liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in securing
justice." Rainsbarger v. Shepherd, 254 Iowa 486, 492, 118 N.W.2d 41, 44 (1962).
" E.g., Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940); Green v. Jones, 136 Colo.
512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957); Mumford v. Robinson, 231 A.2d 477 (Del. 1967); Summersett v.
Linkroum, 44 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1950); Summers v. Summers, 40 111. 2d 338, 239 N.E.2d 795
(1968); Hunter v. Baldwin, 268 Mich. 106, 255 N.W. 431 (1934); Miller v. Treat, 57 Wash.
2d 524, 358 P.2d 143 (1960).
75 E.g., Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N.E.2d 217 (1943). One commentator
describes this process as strictly construing the definition of "guest" while liberally construing the definition of "intoxication," "willful misconduct," and "gross negligence." Georgetta,
supra note 72, at 584. This, of course, would limit the operation of the statute. However,
precisely the opposite approach can be utilized to expand the statute's scope.
76 There are probably as many definitions of "guest" as there are guest statutes. See, e.g.,
PROSSER 187 (listing some questions involved in determining guest status). See also 18
CORNELL L.Q. 621 (1933).
7 American judicial recognition of the difficulty involved in fixing degrees of negligence dates back at least as far as the middle of the nineteenth century. In Steamboat New

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:659

must answer in a typical case involving a guest statute. Because of
the ambiguity of the statutory terms and their apparent immunity
from concrete definition, perhaps the most striking feature of the
courts' application of the guest laws has been its uncertainty and
lack of uniformity. 78 As a result, the field has been thrown into a
79
state of massive confusion.
The significance of this confusion is twofold. First, it has led to
anomalous and often bizarre results.8 0 Widely differing treatment
of similar fact situations is common. This is true with respect to
courts within the same state8 l and courts in different states. 8 2
Attempting to predict when a statute will apply and when it will not
is virtually impossible except at the most obvious extremes.
The second consequence of the confusion surrounding the
World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 469 (1853), the Supreme Court wrestled with the
definition of "gross negligence" in the context of a gratuitous steamboat passenger's claim
against his carrier. But the Supreme Court, like most other courts since that time, was unable
to arrive at a hard and fast formula for determining the existence of gross negligence.
The gross negligence requirement of the statutes can create special problems in a
jurisdiction whose courts do not recognize degrees of negligence. Michigan is an example of
such a jurisdiction. See generally 35 MICH. L. REv. 804 (1937).
Some courts have pressed for certainty of definition. The Oregon Supreme Court, for
example, stressed the need to "provide the clearest possible formula for the.treatment of...
[guest] cases so as to provide a workable guide for the bar and the trial bench." Williamson v.
McKenna, 223 Ore. 366, 371, 354 P.2d 56, 58 (1960). Unfortunately, the court only
succeeded in adding to the confusion by equating "gross negligence" with "recklessness." Id.
at 388, 354 P.2d at 66.
78 W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 259 (1st ed. 1941).
79 "The law as to the duty owed by the driver of an automobile to a guest in his car is in
a tangle of confusion ....
" PROSSER 382.
80 For example, in determining whether a rider is a "guest" within the meaning of the
statute, the California Supreme Court has held that, where P accompanied D for the
purpose of helping D to select Christmas presents, P's services were sufficient "compensation" to take the case out of the "guest" category. Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 143 P.2d
704 (1943). However, the California court has held that sharing expenses is not of itself
sufficient to take the passenger out of the "guest" category. McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. 2d
279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937).
"1 See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES 950-62.
82 Id. A striking example of the disparity between different courts' interpretations of
similar rules is illustrated by the following two cases:
(1) P, having set one foot out of D's car, was injured when the car lurched suddenly.
The guest statute did not preclude recovery because the car was not "moving upon a public
highway" and P was not "riding" within the meaning of the statute. Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal.
2d 89, 94, 98 P.2d 729, 732 (1940).
(2) P was leaning against D's automobile conversing with its occupants with one foot on
the ground and the other on the running board. P was injured when the vehicle lurched
suddenly. The court held that "[w]hen the plaintiff stepped on the running board... the
defendant's duty of care toward her ceased to be measured by his duty toward travellers in
general," and as a guest, P could not recover. Mendes v. Costa, 326 Mass. 608, 610, 96
N.E.2d 161, 162 (1950).
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guest statutes is a flood of litigation concerning fine points of
statutory construction.83 The difficulties which the courts have had
with such ambiguous terms as "guest," "compensation," "gross
negligence," and "willful and wanton misconduct" are not surprising. It is ironic, however, that one of the early justifications for the
statutes, as espoused by the United States Supreme Court, was to
rid the courts of "vexatious litigation" instituted by automobile
guests against their hosts.8 4 In reality, the statutes have probably
had almost no effect on the number of claims asserted, while at the
same time they have probably caused an increase in the time spent
in court on guest claims. 85 As a result, most courts regard guest
statute cases as a judicial headache, 8 6 even though many courts are
in general sympathy with the objectives of the legislation.87
2. Collateral Problems
Aside from the basic difficulties of statutory construction and
interpretation, 88 guest statutes have created other problems for
courts and litigants. One of these is how to deal with guest statutes
in comparative negligence jurisdictions. Some courts have found
limitations upon a guest's right of action against his host to be at
cross purposes with the doctrine of comparative negligence. 89 As
83"There is perhaps no other group of statutes which have filled the courts with
appeals on so many knotty little problems involving petty and otherwise entirely inconsequential points of law." PROSSER 187. A brief look at the annotations following any guest
statute is sufficient to confirm this view.
84 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929).
85 While there are no statistical studies either supporting or denying the validity of this
assertion, it seems logical. The ambiguity of the statutory terms no doubt encourages a
plaintiff-guest to litigate anyway, in the hope that he can persuade the court that he was not
a guest or that the defendant's misconduct was grave enough to allow recovery. The
plaintiff, in most cases, could not simply be thrown out of court. The question of his status
or the defendant's conduct would have to be litigated. Then, if the plaintiff "passed" this
"test," the case could be handled as if it were a "normal" accident case. Therefore, although
the guest statutes have probably cut down on the number of successful claims, they probably
have not cut down on the amount of time spent litigating these claims.
86 Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363, 371, 94 N.W.2d 858, 862 (1959) (commenting on
difficulty of harmonizing statute with common law).
87 Rainsbarger v. Shepherd, 254 iowa 486, 493, 118 N.W.2d 41, 45 (1962) (lamenting
necessity of case-by-case approach).
" See notes 72-87 and accompanying text supra.
8" The comparative negligence rule seeks to avoid the wholesale denial of recovery to
any party who is only partially responsible for an accident. Guest laws-judicial and
legislative-accomplish the opposite result, denying recovery to plaintiffs who are usually
totally free of any kind of negligence. Thus, they contravene the spirit of comparative
negligence.
In McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962),
the court held that the judicial guest statute promulgated in O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456,
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the comparative negligence rule continues to spread to more
American jurisdictions, 90 it is not difficult to envision numerous
situations in which the juxtaposition of guest statutes against comparative negligence rules will lead to more conflicts and
inconsistencies. 91
Another difficulty concerns conflict of laws problems involving
guest statutes. 92 This is especially true when a court must decide
whether to apply the law of a guest statute jurisdiction or the law
of a non-guest statute jurisdiction. Non-guest statute jurisdictions
have been especially reluctant to apply foreign guest statutes.93 In
a leading case 94 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire applied five
factors to resolve the conflict 95 and concluded that it "should not go
out of [its] way to enforce such a law of another state as against the
better law of [its] own state." 96 Other courts have similarly utilized97
conflicts rules to avoid application of foreign guest statutes,
indicating the increasing unpopularity of the statutes in states not
having them.
C. Incompatibility with Recent Developments
Over the years, criticism of the guest statutes has relied
increasingly on public policy and evidence of a growing inconsistency
between the rationale of the statutes and the emerging emphasis on
responsibility for gratuitous undertakings and compensation for
185 N.W. 525 (1921), was no longer applicable and declared that "the new rule [of
reasonable care] announced herein is more in harmony with the principle of comparative
negligence . . . than was the former rule." 15 Wis. 2d at 384-85, 113 N.W.2d at 20.
11 See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, REPORT 74

(1969) (recommending adoption of Wisconsin-type comparative negligence doctrine in other
states).
91

See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, MINORITY

REPORT OF ORVILLE RICHARDSON 22-23 (1969).
92 See generally Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1970).

93 New Hampshire and New York are two good examples. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 107
N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) (refusing to apply Vermont guest statute); Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (refusing to apply
Ontario guest statute).Butsee Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463 (1965) (distinguishing Babcock and applying Colorado guest statute over strong dissent).
9 Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
9 The court summarized them as follows: (1) "predictability of results," (2) "maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship among the states," (3) "[s]implification
of the judicial task," (4) "advancement of [a state's own] . . . governmental interests" over
those of other states, and (5) "the court's preference for what it regards as the sounder rule
of law, as between the two competing ones." Id. at 354-55, 222 A.2d at 208-09. These five
considerations were first articulated as a group by Professor Leflar in Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267, 282-304 (1966).
96 107 N.H. at 357, 222 A.2d at 210.
9' See Ehrenzweig, supra note 92, at 602-03.
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accident victims. The laws have been labelled "archaic" 98 and are
said to "contradict the spirit of the times." 99 It is probably the
changing of circumstances that has done the most to increase the
flow of criticism.
1. Gratuitous Undertakings
One consequence of almost universal ownership and use of
automobiles is that giving and accepting free rides is not unusual.
No longer is the host driver deemed to be conferring any special
gift of "health and pleasure"'10 0 upon his gratuitous passengers. In
other words, the more modern view is that the driver is not put out
very much by giving a free ride and, from an economic standpoint,
"the favor is hardly worth the price exacted from the injured in
thus absolving the wrongdoer."''
This view coincides with the reasoning of the Restatement of
Torts concerning gratuitous undertakings.' 0 2 According to the Restatement, one who enters upon the performance of a service involving the safety of another is bound by the standard of "reasonable
care" if the other relies upon the undertaking. 0 3 Although this
logic is usually applied to "emergency" situations, 0 4 there is no
reason to doubt that a guest passenger is just as likely as an
emergency rider to rely upon the safe driving of the host driver. It
supports the view that one who does not pay for a ride does not, by
his failure to pay, waive the right to expect that his host will
exercise reasonable care for his safety.
2. Insurance and Compensation
Circumstances and attitudes relating to automobile liability
insurance have changed considerably since the enactment of the
first guest statutes. If they were not before, critics are now well
90 1 Wyo. L.J. 182, 186 (1947).
99 Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 357, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (1966).
100 18 CALIF. L. REv. 184 (1930).
101 Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 283, 176 A.2d 483, 487 (1961).
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
103 § 323. Negligent.Performance of Undertaking to Render Services
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from
his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
104

See id. (comments (a)-(b)).
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aware of the role played by insurance companies in pushing guest
statutes through the state legislatures.' 0 5 In other words, the statutes are now seen as pieces of special interest legislation for the
principal benefit of insurance companies. As insurance companies,
and not drivers' pocketbooks, have become the principal source of
compensation for injuries, this point has become increasingly
clear. 0 6 With compulsory liability insurance and financial responsibility laws in effect in nearly all jurisdictions, it is the exception,
rather than the rule, that a host would ever have to pay a claim by a
guest out of his own pocket.
Our society's attitude toward insurance in general has also
changed in recent years. At the time the guest statutes were
enacted, the prevailing view of automobile liability insurance was
that it was a protective rather than a compensatory device.' 0 7 As a
general rule, the primary goal of the insurance companies was to
defeat claims against their policyholders. Over the years, however,
this exclusively protective attitude has come to be regarded as
increasingly unresponsive to the modern attitude favoring compensation for those injured in automobile accidents. 0 8
This increased emphasis on the compensation of accident
victims is largely responsible for the numerous proposals for reform of the prevailing tort approach -to automobile accident
litigation-including the various "reparations" or "no-fault"
plans.' 0 9 The enthusiasm that has built up for no-fault insurance
105 It

has been

pointed out that there obviously

could not have

been any

counter-balancing lobby group of "unknown injured persons of the future." Tipton 288.
Dean Pedrick also noted the effectiveness of the insurance lobby:
It is a tribute to the lobby system of legislation that in this country a surgeon
operating on a charity patient is bound to exercise ordinary care but is permitted,
should he drive his patient home from the hospital, to abandon that standard and
be subjected to liability only on proof of gross negligence or wilful and wanton
misconduct.

Pedrick, supra note 38, at 92; see notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra.
106 See McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 383, 113 N.W.2d
14, 19 (1962).
107 "[I]nsurance is given primarily as a protection to the operator, not as an accident
policy to assist the injured person." Weber, supra note 5, at 59.
108 The virtually universal adoption of "financial responsibility" laws is evidence of the
growing concept of insurance as a compensatory device. According to one court, one of the
most evident policies behind the enactment of such laws was "to ... provide compensation
for those injured through no fault of their own." Interinsurance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
58 Cal. 2d 142, 154, 373 P.2d 640, 646, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 598 (1962).
109

See, e.g., COMMITTEE To STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT

TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1932); A.
EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954); L. GREEN, TRAFFIC
VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); R.,KEETON &
FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965);

J.

J.

O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION

O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF
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since the mid-1960's" ° is indicative of the emerging view that
automobile liability insurance ought to be both protective and comAnd automobile
pensatory, rather than merely protective.'
guests-particularly family members and friends-are usually the
people whom policyholders would most like to see compensated for
their injuries."12 Although allowing claims by family members and
friends opens up the possibility of collusion," 3 the insurer would
seem to be well protected against such fraudulent claims by existing
criminal sanctions 1 4 and by the usual insurance policy 5conditions
requiring the insured to cooperate with the insurer."1
One possible drawback to the extension of compensation to
injured guests is the claim by defenders of the guest statutes that
this would cause insurance rates to skyrocketJ 6 On the surface,
broadening coverage to include guests might appear to be an
invitation to premium increases, and it is only logical to assume that
extended coverage would increase the cost of insurance. However,
according to one survey" 7 comparing rates in guest statute and
non-guest statute jurisdictions, the existence or nonexistence of a
guest statute was found to be essentially irrelevant to differences in
rates. One must conclude that, although the existence of a guest
statute would be expected to have some lowering effect on insurance rates, this effect is so overshadowed by other factors, such as
NO-FAULT INSURANCE (1971). These plans and their subsequent statutory embodiments are
dealt with in notes 183-98 and accompanying text infra.
110 The Keeton-O'Connell "Basic Protection Insurance" plan has been the focal point of
discussion concerning no-fault insurance. See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, REPORT (1969); AMERICAN INSURANCE Assoc. SPECIAL COMI. To
STUDY AND EVALUATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE

ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, REPORT (1968).
I See, e.g., Gibson, Let's Abolish Guest PassengerLegislation, 35 MANITOBA B. NEWS 274
(1965).
112 ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, MINORITY REPORT OF
ORVILLE RICHARDSON 23 (1969).

For the treatment of guest passengers under the various no-fault laws currently in force,
see notes 183-98 and accompanying text infra.
113 See, e.g., 1 HARPER & JAMES 650.
114 These sanctions cover both perjury and collusion. See White, supra note 6, at 333.
"5 See 1 HARPER & JAMES 650. See also Allstate Ins. Co. Crusader Policy, CCH AUTO. L.
2703, 2980 (1972). Paragraph 2980, the "Assistance and Cooperation" clause,
REP.
provides in part that "[t]he insured shall cooperate with Allstate, disclosing all pertinentfacts
known or available to him." (Emphasis added). In addition, 2703, entitled "Proof of Claim;
Medical Reports," provides: "The insured and every other person making claim hereunder
shall submit to examinations under oath by any person named by Allstate and subscribe the
same, as often as may reasonably be required." (Emphasis added).
116 See, e.g., Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 224, 234 N.W. 581, 584 (1931).
117 Tipton 304-07.
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population density,"" that the net effect of the statute on rates is
negligible. 1 9 Therefore, as a practical matter, guest statutes cannot
be said to have brought about noticeable decreases in insurance
premiums.
III
THE NEW ATTACK ON THE STATUTES

A.

Repeal
In 1969-thirty years after the last guest statute was
enacted' 2 0-the state of Vermont repealed its guest statute.' 2' In
doing so, Vermont became the second state-after Connecticut' 22 -to legislatively abandon the doctrine that a guest could
only recover for injuries caused by the driver's "gross or willful
negligence.' 2 3 Repeal came about quietly and, interestingly
enough,24 with no active opposition from the state's insurance
lobby.'
The principal reasons for repeal related to the difficulties
faced by the courts in attempting to apply the statute. 2 5 Prior to
the adoption of the statute, different degrees of negligence were
not recognized in Vermont.' 26 The guest statute forced the courts
to distinguish between the different degrees of negligence, with
resulting confusion and uncertainty. 27 After forty years of operation, the statute had so beclouded the issue of degrees of
at 305.
at 306-07.
20 See notes 2-3 supra.
121 See note 8 supra.
122 See note 71 supra.
118 Id.
119 Id.

tit. 23, § 1491 (1967).
According to the sponsor of the bill (H. Bill 297), Representative Timothy
O'Connor, there was no pressure of any kind from insurance companies. Telephone
conversation with Vermont State Representative Timothy O'Connor, October 30, 1973
(notes on file at the Cornell Law Review).
123 VT. STAT. ANN.
124

125 Id.

126 In one of the first cases arising under the guest statute, the Vermont Supreme Court

observed:
[H]eretofore the term "gross negligence" has found no separate division or degree
of negligence [in Vermont common law] except, perhaps, in the law of bailments.
The term "wilful negligence" has been hitherto completely unknown to us. But
although the doctrine of definitive degrees of negligence is not recognized as a part
of our common law, where, as here, it has been made the basis of a legislative rule,
it cannot be treated as meaningless or denied application.
Sorrell v. White, 103 Vt. 277, 281, 153 A. 359, 361 (1931) (citations omitted).
127 See, e.g., Rivard v. Roy, 124 Vt. 32, 196 A.2d 497 (1963) (attempting to define "gross
negligence"). See also Chamberlain v. Delphia, 118 Vt. 193, 103 A.2d 94 (1954) (observing
that distinctions must be made on case-by-case basis).
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negligence that it was virtually impossible to distinguish between
ordinary and gross negligence.' 2 8 In addition, the Vermont statute
suffered12 9from the common difficulty of determining who is a
"guest."'

The repeal bill initially encountered opposition as a "lawyers'
bill."'130 This resistance subsided, however, when attention was
called to the inequities and inconsistencies of the guest statute, and
the repeal passed quickly.' 3 ' Repeal became effective in 1970.132
Two years later, the Florida legislature followed the same
course.' 33 In Florida, opposition to the guest statute had been
building for some time 1 34 and attempts to repeal the statute had
been made at least as early as 1966.135 According to the repeal bill's
sponsor, the basic reason for eliminating the Florida law was that it
was 'just a bad statute" based on the "unreal" rationale of trying to
prevent suits by ungrateful hitchhikers against their hosts.' 36 It was
felt that the statute operated to frustrate the "reasonable expectations" of the insured that an injured passenger should be compensated, regardless of his relationship to the driver.' 3 7 Therefore, it
was considered a bad piece of legislation whose repeal was long
overdue.
As in Vermont, 38 pressure from the insurance industry proved
128 This "watering down" of the statute was cited by the repeal bill's sponsor as the
principal reason for eliminating the statute. Conversation with Rep. O'Connor, supra note
124.
129 See, e.g., Stevens v. Nurenburg, 117 Vt. 525, 97 A.2d 250 (1953); Russell v. Pilger,
113 Vt. 537, 37 A.2d 403 (1944); Shappy v. McGarry, 106 Vt. 466, 174 A. 856 (1934).
130 Conversation with Rep. O'Connor, supra note 124. Presumably, this was a reference
to the fact that lawyers might be expected, if the statute were repealed, to increase their
"business" by taking claims by guests, who were not heretofore able to recover for ordinary
negligence.
131 Representative O'Connor pointed out that, under the guest statute, a situation could
arise in which a truck driver, who was transporting a neighbor's cow and who picked up the
neighbor's hitchhiking son, could negligently drive both into an accident as a result of which
the neighbor could recover for injuries to his cow, but not for injuries to his son. This
illustration apparently proved persuasive. Id.
132 See note 8 supra.
133 See note 9 supra.
134 For a critical discussion of the Florida statute, see Tipton.
135 Telephone conversation with former Florida State Senator Harold S. Wilson, September 6, 1973 (notes on file at the Cornell Law Review). Some attempts may have been made
earlier. According to Senator Wilson, the sponsor of the successful repeal bill, this was when
he first introduced the bill. Id.
'36 Id.
137 In Senator Wilson's view, when motorists were guilty of negligence and their friends
were injured, they expected their friends to be compensated. They did not expect their
insurance companies to "hide" behind the guest statute. Id.
138 See note 124 supra.
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nonexistent. 13 9

to be virtually
One probable explanation for this
lack of opposition to repeal lies in the fact that Florida had just
passed a no-fault automobile liability insurance law during the
previous legislative session. 140 The new law provided coverage for
"passengers"' 4' which would probably include guest passengers.
The insurance companies, therefore, probably felt that, with guests
already covered to a large extenit by the no-fault law, there would
be little point in opposing repeal of the guest statute.' 42
A more important, if not the most important, factor seems to
have been the legislature's desire to eliminate what it considered a
"basically unfair" piece of legislation.143 But, in addition, it is
expected that, in both states, repeal will eliminate the numerous
and complex questions that necessarily had to be litigated under
the guest statutes. And, while the number of suits by guests may
logically be. expected to rise, a large number of "knotty little
problems involving petty and otherwise entirely inconsequential
points of law"'14 4 will no longer have to be litigated. Courts will be
able to turn away from such questions as whether or not the
plaintiff was a "guest," and can concentrate on the basic issue of
whether or not the defendant was negligent. 4 5
B.

Partial Repeal
Both Illinois and Texas, although not eliminating their statutes
entirely, have recently modified them. In 1971, Illinois amended its
guest statute by narrowing its previously broad definition of
"guests" to include only those who illegally solicit rides.' 4 6 In thus
"9 Telephone conversation with former Sen. Wilson, supra note 135.
140

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741 (1972).

141Id. § 627.736(1).
142

Under the no-fault plan, the injured party would recover up to the statutory

maximum. According to Senator Wilson, the insurance companies probably felt that a
sufficient number of guest claims would fall within this range to prevent lobbying against
repeal from being worth the effort and expense. At the same time, however, Senator Wilson
emphasized that, although no-fault may have softened opposition to repeal, it was not the
motivating force behind the legislature's action. Telephone conversation with former Sen.
Wilson, supra note 135.
143 Id.
144 PROSSER 187.
145 As one observer suggested long before repeal, such a simplification of the Florida
law "would tend to bring back order, equality, and harmony [and] ... would get the Florida
Supreme Court 'off the hook.'" Tipton 311.
146 As amended, the guest law reads in relevant part:
No person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a guest without
payment for such ride and who has solicited such ride in violation of Subsection (a) of
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restricting the class of persons denied recovery for ordinary negligence to "true" hitchhikers, the Illinois legislature appears to have
recognized the desire of most motorists to guarantee compensation
for injured friends and family members1 4 7 but not for "ungrateful"
hitchhikers.' 48 Because the number of guest cases involving hitchhikers is relatively small,' 4 9 it can be expected that the Illinois
statute will operate to deny recovery to only a very small percentage of automobile guests.
Texas, although not circumscribing its guest statute to so great
an extent, nevertheless eliminated some of the law's harshness by
revising it to deny recovery only to guests "who [are] related within
the second degree of consanguinity or affinity to the owner or
operator of a motor vehicle."' 50 In allowing recovery by nonrelated passengers, the Texas legislature apparently felt that the
"hospitality rationale" for guest statutes was no longer viable. And
by denying recovery only to related passengers, the legislature
indicated that it considered collusion a danger only where a family
relation existed between the plaintiff and the defendant.' 5 ' By this
"partial repeal," therefore, the statute loses much of its
"overinclusiveness,"'152 but retains its potential for confusion and
unfairness in cases involving related individuals.
Section 11-1006 of this Act [prohibiting hitchhiking], nor his personal representative
in the event of the death of such guest, shall have a cause of action ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 10-201 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (emphasis added). This
portion of the statute formerly read:
No person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a guest without
payment for such ride, or while engaged in a joint enterprise with the owner or driver of
such motor vehicle or motorcycle, nor his personal representative in the event of the
death of such guest, shall have a cause of action ....
Section 9.201, [1957] Ill. Laws 2806 (emphasis added).
147 See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
148 See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
149

See PROSSER 187 & n.8.

150 Ch. 28, § 3, [1973] Tex. Laws 42, amending TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 6701b (1969).
This amendment added the caveat that "[njothing in this 'Act affects any judicially-developed
and developing rules under which a person is or is not totally or partially immune from tort
liability to another by virtue of a family relationship." It is interesting to note that this
amendment was approved on April 9, 1973, and on April 24, 1973, the Texas no-fault law
(including coverage for "guest occupants") was enacted. See note 195 infra.
151 A comparison of the Texas and Illinois modifications indicates that, while the Texas
legislature considered the hospitality rationale no longer viable but felt that collusion was still
a danger in intrafamily suits, the Illinois legislature took the opposite view that hospitality
still required some protection btit that collusion prevention was no longer a valid object of its
statute. See notes 146-49 and accompanying text supra.
152 This would probably render it much less susceptible to the type of constitutional
attack that was mounted against the California guest statute in the Brown case. See notes
156-81 and accompanying text infra.
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C. Judicial Nullification
Prior to 1973, the principal form of judicial attack upon guest
statutes consisted of progressively weakening them through restrictive interpretation. 153 In many guest statute jurisdictions, the
definition of "guest" grew narrower and the definition of "gross
negligence" (and similar ,terms for misconduct) grew broader with
each judicial interpretation. 54 The intent and the result of such
construction was, of course,55 to limit the operation of the guest
statutes wherever possible.'
Of course, there are limits to this technique. When the plaintiff
is unquestionably a guest and the defendant's misconduct clearly
falls short of "gross negligence," a court may be unable or unwilling to give the plaintiff relief through a strained interpretation of
statutory language. A court in that situation may be forced to take
a more forthright approach-as did the Supreme Court of California in the 1973 case of Brown v. Merlo'15 6-and declare its state's
guest statute' 5 7 unconstitutional. In Brown, the plaintiff fell
"squarely within the class of persons to whom the guest statute
dehie[d] recovery for simple negligence."'1 58 His cause of action for
"willful misconduct" resulted in an adverse jury verdict from which
he took no appeal. The only appeal, which was taken from the trial
court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment
against the plaintiff's cause of action in negligence, was based
"an
squarely on the plaintiff's assertion that the guest statute 5was
9
law."'
the
of
protection
equal
of
denial
unconstitutional
Although other courts had viewed the United States Supreme
153 See notes 72-75 supra.
154 See, e.g., note 75 supra.

155 The maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law were to be strictly
construed was the most frequent justification for this approach. See note 74 supra. This
rationale is criticized severely in Comment, JudicialNullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 884 (1968).
156 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973). The case is commented upon
in 23 DRAKE L. REV. 216 (1973).
157 The California statute read:
No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven by
another with his permission and no person who as a guest accepts a ride in any
vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other
person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle or
against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the driver on account of
personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during the ride, unless the
plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted
from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1971).

158 8 Cal. 3d at 860-61, 506 P.2d at 215-16, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92.
159 Id. at 860, 506 P.2d at 215, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
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Court's adjudication in Silver 1 60 as determinative of the constitutionality of most guest statutes, 16 1 the California court did not find
Silver to be a major obstacle. The court felt that the Silver Court
had considered only the statutory distinction between automobile
guests and guests in other kinds of conveyances and had left
untouched two additional distinctions: those "between 'guests' and
paying passengers and between different categories of automobile
62
guests."'
The court then proceeded to attack the two traditional
justifications for the statute: the protection of hospitality and the
prevention of collusive lawsuits. 6 3 The protection of hospitality
was found to be a poor basis for the statute's classifications. The
fact that automobile guests were treated differently from other
social guests was considered contrary to modern trends in California law, 164 and the court found "no realistic state purpose which
supports such a [discriminatory] classification scheme."' 6 5 The
California court pointed out numerous inconsistencies in the hospitality rationale 1 66 and concluded that, even if that rationale had
been valid at one time, changed circumstances had caused it to lose
whatever validity it might have had. 1 67 On this basis, "the statute's
160 280 U.S. i17 (1929); see notes 42-50 And accompanying text supra.'

MnSee, e.g., Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d 961 (1937); Naudzius v.
Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 587 (1931).
162 8 Cal. 3d at 863 n.4, 506 P.2d at 217-18 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94 n.4. It can be
argued that the California court was overenthusiastic in dismissing Silver as a controlling case
because of its age and the changing of circumstances. The United States Supreme Court, as
recently as 1972, dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question" the appeal of a
plaintiff guest passenger who claimed that the Ohio guest statute violated the federal and
state constitutions. Retza v. Fortune, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). Nevertheless, certain features (see
notes 173-77 and accompanying text infra) of the California statute are sufficiently unique to
severely restrict any comparison with statutes previously adjudicated.
163 8 Cal. 3d at 864, 506 P.2d at 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
164 Id. at 865, 506 P.2d at 219-20, 106 Cal, Rptr. at 395-96. The court stated that
"[u]nder current California law .... guests or recipients of hospitality may generally demand
that their hosts exercise due care so as not to injure them." Id. at 865, 506 P.2d at 219, 106
Cal. Rptr. at 395 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968), which eliminated most distinctions regarding guests on real property).
165 8 Cal. 3d at 865, 506 P.2d at 219, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
166 Id. at 866-69, 506 P.2d at 220-21, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97. The court pointed to
such anomalies as protecting pedestrians or guests in other cars, but not protecting the
driver's own guest. In addition, the court pointed out that in an age when virtually all drivers
are covered by liability insurance, the filing of an insurance claim against the host's insurer
cannot be considered an act of "ingratitude" toward the host.
167 Id. (citing Milnot v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972), and Chastleton
Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924)). In Sinclair,Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court,
had declared that "[a] law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain
state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change
even though valid when passed." 264 U.S. at 547-48 (emphasis added).
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discriminatory treatment of auto guests [could not] be upheld
'6
against plaintiff's constitutional attack.' 1
Similarly, the California Supreme Court found that the "collusion prevention" rationale did not justify "the statute's wholesale
elimination of all automobile guests' causes of action for negligently
inflicted injury."'169 Again, recent developments in the law were
a major factor. In a series of cases abrogating intrafamilial
immunity 170 the court had declared that
the fact that there may be greater opportunity for fraud or
collusion in one class of cases than another does not warrant
courts of law in closing the door to all cases of that class. Courts
must depend upon the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret
out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular cases.' 7 1
Because of this "overinclusiveness" and because the absence of
compensation is not determinative of a willingness to commit
perjury, the court concluded that the statute also "fail[ed] to accord
equal treatment to those who are similarly, situated with respect to
' 72
its goal of the prevention of collusion."'
Finally, the court found that not even all automobile guests
were treated alike under the statute. Because of various exceptions
and loopholes arising from the statutory language, recovery often
depended upon factors bearing no relation to the protection of
hospitality or the prevention of collusion. 1 73 Liability could depend
on such factors as whether or not the passenger had one foot on
the ground, 1 74 or whether the vehicle was moving on the highway
or on the shoulder of the highway.' 75 The court had previously
found that, as a result of these and similar technicalities, "the
relationship between the driver and occupant of a motor vehicle
8 Cal. 3d at 872, 506 P.2d at 224, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
Id.
170Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (rejecting
collusion rationale as bar to child-parent suit); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26
Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (applying similar reasoning to suit between husband and wife); Emery
v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (rejecting collusion rationale as reason for
barring suit by two sisters .against their brother).
171 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 431, 289 P.2d 218, 225 (1955).
172 8 Cal. 3d at 878, 506 P.2d at 228, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
173 In addition to limiting its coverage to automobile guests, section 17158 conditions the denial of a cause of action for negligence on three independent matters:
the injury must take place (1) "during the ride," (2) "in any vehicle" and (3) "upon
the highway."
Id. at 879, 506 P.2d at 229, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
174 See, e.g., Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940) (discussed in note 82
supra).
175 See, e.g., Olson v. Clifton, 273 Cal. App. 2d .359, 78 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1969).
168
169
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may fluctuate during the course of a single trip, as circumstances
bring them within or without the language of the statute. 1 7 6 The
inconsistencies thus arising gave added weight to the proposition
that the statute afforded unequal treatment to similarly situated
persons and therefore denied equal protection.17 7
While recognizing that not "only the common law rules of
negligence can govern automobile liability,"'1 78 and that "the great
office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they
are developed, and to' adapt it to the changes of time and
circumstances,' 7 9 the court concluded that the "irrational discrimination [of the statute] cannot be squared with the applicable
constitutional standards.' 8 0 The court summarized its holding as
follows:
[W]e have concluded that the classifications which the guest
statute creates between those denied and those permitted recovery for negligently inflicted injuries do not bear a substantial and
rational relation to the statute's purposes of protecting the hospitality of the host-driver and of preventing collusive lawsuits.We
therefore hold that, as applied to a negligently injured guest, the
guest statute violates the equal protection 81guarantees of the
California and United States Constitutions.'
With this stroke, California returned to a common law rule enacted
in statutory form in 1872 declaring that "[a] carrier of persons
without reward must use ordinary care and diligence for their safe
82
carriage."'
176 O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 998, 429 P.2d 160, 162, 59 Cal. Rptr. 840,
842 (1967) (emphasis added). For a satirical, yet logically plausible, hypothetical illustration
of this "fluctuating liability," see Lascher, supra note 6, at 14, in which the liability of a
husband driving his wife to the post office changes with virtually every move the parties
make.
177 8 Cal. 3d at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
178

Id.

Id. (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)).
180 8 Cal. 3d at 883, 506 P.2d at 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
181 Id. at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407. It is interesting to note that with
this decision, the court fulfilled the prophecy of one observer made five years earlier:
Three and a half decades of confusion, illogic, solecism, gamesmanship-and
unconstitutionality-are enough ....
[Ilt is time for some court to play the role of
the proverbial small boy and point out the truth to the sovereign-that the
legislation is unclothed by constitutionality.
One tends to suspect that somewhere in this great state the right court is just
waiting to be asked in the right way in the right case.
Lascher, supra note 6, at 31.
182 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2096 (West 1954).
After the Brown decision, the California legislature amended § 17158 to delete any
reference to "guests." The statute now denies recovery only to a person riding in his own car
while it is being "driven by another person with his permission." CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158
(West Supp. 1974), as amended ch. 803, § 4, [1973] Cal. Stat. -.
179
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D. *ModificationThrough No-Fault Plans
In 1970, Massachusetts became the first state to adopt a nofault automobile liability insurance plan. 83 Among the provisions
of its "personal injury protection" scheme was coverage for various
injured persons, "includinga guest occupant."'1 4 Thus, by the specific
language of the statute, all guest passengers injured in the state
were to receive the financial benefits of no-fault insurance at least
85
up to the amount provided by the statute.
A year later, the legislature, apparently realizing that "[iut
would be rather anomalous to allow recovery to a guest up to the
statutory maximum under the 'no-fault' plan and yet require that
he prove gross negligence for a common law recovery,"''8 6 passed a
statute allowing a guest recovery for "ordinary negligence" on the
part of the operator. 8 7 This act, of course, abrogated the fifty-four
year'old rule of Massaletti v. Fitzroy'"8 that an automobile guest
"ought to prove a materially greater degree of negligence" than a
paying passenger. 8 9 Consistent adherence to the concept of nofault insurance, according to the Massachusetts legislature, required that restrictions on a guest passenger's cause of action
against his host be eliminated. 90
No-fault insurance laws have been influential in effecting similar changes in other guest statute jurisdictions. The repeal of the
Florida guest statute, 19' while not considered a direct result of
no-fault legislation, certainly appears to have been aided by the
prior passage of the no-fault law.' 9 2 Had the legislature not repealed the guest statute, an anomaly similar to that which existed
for a short time in Massachusetts' 93 would have arisen whereby a
guest could collect up to the no-fault policy maximum, but would
183 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A-N (Supp. 1972).
184 Id. (emphasis added).

185At the time of enactment, the minimum coverage was "at least two thousand dollars"
with additional provisions for lost wages and other expenses. Id.
186 Smith, Duty Owed to Guest Occupants in Motor Vehicles-A Comment on the New Massachusetts Statute (Chapter 865 of the Acts of 1971), 57 Mass. L.Q. 59, 61 (1972).
187MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 85L (Supp. 1972):
In an action of tort for personal injuries, property damage or consequential
damages caused by or arising from the operation of a motor vehicle in which the
plaintiff was a passenger in the exercise of due care, the plaintiff may recover in an
action against the operator upon proof that said operator was guilty of ordinary
.negligence resulting in said injuries or damages.
188 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
189 Id. at 510, 118 N.E. at 177.
190 Smith, supra note 186, at 61.
191 See notes 133-45 and accompanying text supra.
192 See notes 140-42 and accompanying text supra.
193 See note 186 and accompanying text supra.
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be precluded from suing for damages in excess of that amount
without a showing of gross negligence.' 94 Such anomalies persist,
however, in twelve guest statute jurisdictions that have recently
adopted no-fault plans.' 95 Once recovery is allowed at all, it seems
illogical to allow it up to a certain amount and then to cut it off
19 6
entirely.
Despite the legislative modifications undertaken in Massachusetts and Florida, the inconsistencies between the guest statutes and the emerging no-fault laws will probably remain for some
time. Unfortunately, interested groups have failed to take a decisive stand on the desirability of eliminating the arlomalous coexistence of guest laws and no-fault statutes. The American Bar
Association, for example, has recommended adoption of a no-fault
plan whose coverage would include "guest passengers in the
insured's vehicle."' 97 At the same time, however, the Association
has failed to make any recommendations with regard to the guest
statutes, declaring that "[t]he decision to retain or repeal them is an
uncomplicated one [that] . . . should be left to the. states."' 98
Without leadership from the bar or other influential organizations
194 The benefit provisions of the statute cover "passengers." There is no basis to
conclude that this term would have excluded "guest passengers." See notes 140-42 and
accompanying text supra.
195 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-4014 to -4021 (Supp. 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
13-25-1 to -22 (19-) (CCH AUTO. L. REP.
1946 (1973)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118

(19-) (CCH AUTO. L. REP.
1948 (1973)); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.150-.163
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (declared unconstitutional because of technical flaws in Grace v.
Howlett, 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972)); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to -3121
(1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.13101-.13179 (Supp. 1973); ch. 530, §§ 1-60, [1973] Nev.
Laws 822; ORE. REV. STAT.'§§ 743.805-.835 (1971); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-23-6
to -8 (Supp. 1973); TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.06-3 (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-1

to -22 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-3801.1, 46.1-497.1 (Supp. 1973).
Although only three statutes-those of Illinois, Oregon, and Texas-specifically refer to
guests, it would be hard to argue that the failure of other statutes to mention guests reveals
an intent to exempt them from coverage. The broadness of the terms used--e.g.,
"passengers"-indicates that guests are to be included in the coverage provisions.
196 This arbitrary cut-off of recovery might be considered a ratification of the idea that
a guest is only "ungrateful" when his injuries exceed a certain monetary limit; and the more
severely he is injured, the more "ungrateful" he is. See Note, The Future of the Automobile Guest
Statutes, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 432, 445 (1972).
197 Kornblum, No-Fault Automobile Insurance-A Comparison of the State Plans and the
Uniform Act, 8 A.B.A.F. 175, 176 (1972).
198 ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, REPORT 86-87 (1969).
The Minority Report criticized the majority's cursory examination of the guest statute
problem and urged the ABA to "take a forthright position on this .highly controversial
matter." ABA SPECIAL COINM. ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, MINORITY REPORT OF
ORVILLE RICHARDSON 22 (1969). Richardson looked at the statutes in much more detail and

found them to be at crosspurposes with numerous majority recommendations such as the
adoption of comparative negligence and the abolition of family tort immunities. Id. at 22-23.
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it is doubtful that there will ever be a concerted effort to modify or
repeal the guest statutes. It may take several years of ambiguity,
inconsistency, and unfairness before the individual state legislatures fully realize the extent of the conflict between the guest
statutes and the spirit of no-fault insurance.
CONCLUSION

The tension between the archaic philosophy of the guest
statutes and modern views of negligence and insurance compensation has become increasingly evident. Yet the difficulties of
eliminating this inconsistency are manifest. The statutes are favored in the courts by precedent, age, and judicial restraint. In the
legislatures, the statutes are not the objects of the massive popular
outrage that can be so potent a force in bringing about the repeal
of laws that discriminate against groups more cohesive than automobile guests.
Nevertheless, the rise of no-fault insurance and the corresponding reevaluation of insurance and responsibility for negligence offer the state legislatures a new opportunity to reexamine
their guest statutes. And, as the contrast between the punitive
thrust of the guest laws and the compensatory emphasis of the
no-fault laws becomes sharper, the states, in the interest of consistency and certainty, will no doubt gradually begin repealing their
guest statutes. It seems likely, therefore, that the era of the automobile guest statutes will end "[n]ot with a bang but a
whimper."' 99
Stanley W. Widger, Jr.
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